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Abstract 
 
The Global Positioning System (GPS) uses a network of orbiting and geostationary satellites to calculate the 
position of a receiver over time.   This technology has revolutionised a wide range of safety-critical industries and 
leisure applications ranging from commercial fisheries through to mountain running.    These systems provide 
diverse benefits; supplementing the users existing navigation skills and reducing the uncertainty that often 
characterises many route planning tasks.  GPS applications can also help to reduce workload by automating tasks 
that would otherwise require finite cognitive and perceptual resources.  However, the operation of these systems has 
been identified as a contributory factor in a range of recent accidents.   Users often come to rely on GPS applications 
and, therefore, fail to notice when they develop faults or when errors occur in the other systems that use the data 
from these systems.   Further accidents can stem from the ‘over confidence’ that arises when users assume 
automated warnings will be issued when they stray from an intended route.   Unless greater attention is paid to the 
human factors of GPS applications then there is a danger that we will see an increasing number of these failures as 
positioning technologies are integrated into increasing numbers of applications. 
 
Introduction 
 
Manual navigation techniques have changed very little over the centuries.  For example, commercial and leisure 
activities continue to rely on dead reckoning where an initial position is established.  The position is then estimated 
over time using an individual or vessel’s speed and direction. The accuracy of dead reckoning calculations depend 
on the accuracy of the speed input and the effects of environmental factors including wind and current.  After the 
Second World War, the development of radar and of differential radio signals helped to establish automated 
approaches to position location.   These can be thought of as precursors to the satellite based GPS systems that have 
now become commonplace.   GPS units are sold ‘as standard’ with many cars.   They are widely used across the 
maritime industries.    They can be carried in your pocket and attached to PDAs; providing continuous updates of 
location information during both work and leisure activities.  This growth in the application of GPS technologies has 
fuelled and been fuelled by the use of these systems in safety-critical applications.   For example, they have been 
integrated into the cockpits of both commercial and general aviation.   However, the adoption of GPS systems in 
safety-related applications has led to a number of concerns.   The FAA recognises that GPS alone cannot satisfy the 
high-levels of accuracy and redundancy that would be required across the National Airspace System.   In 
consequence, a number of local and wide area augmentation schemes have been proposed.   In Europe, more 
strategic concerns have been raised and plans continue to be revised for the creation of an alternate system. 
 
It is important not to underestimate the complexity of human interaction with GPS applications.  For example, the 
US National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) released a warning in 2002 about some of the 
systemic effects of GPS on navigation behaviour.  In particular, they observed that some mariners were more willing 
to follow higher risk routes closer to known hazards because they felt confident in the use of GPS technology to 
accurately identify the position of those hazards.  NOAA went on to point out that the increasing accuracy of GPS 
fixes exposes underlying problems in the accuracy of charts and maps.  Many of these guides were developed using 
less accurate fixes than those provided using GPS technology.   It was argued that “prudent mariners should pass 
charted hazards such as shoals or isolated dangers with utmost caution and at a safe distance, no matter what 
navigational method is used”  (NOAA, 2002). 
 
Most of the concerns over the integration of GPS in safety related systems have focussed on technical and 
infrastructure issues.  These include potential disruption to services from unintentional interference.  Studies have 
 been conducted to exclude or minimise the impact of very high frequency (VHF) radio, over the-horizon (OTH) 
military radar, and broadcast television.  There is also growing concern over the vulnerability of navigation tools to 
external attack.   One recent study described how a $300 jammer could cause the sudden loss of GPS signal (John 
Hopkins).   In the most critical scenario, this might cause an aircrew to abort a Category III precision approach.   
However, many existing systems would use interpolation and dead reckoning so that performance degradation 
would be extremely limited immediately after a signal was lost. Arguably greater concern centers on longer term 
disruption to GPS signals in future scenarios in which these applications become more tightly integrated with Air 
Traffic Management services. 
 
Such concerns are shaping the future application of GPS technology.  In contrast, these systems have already been 
implicated in a number of accidents where the underlying technology worked as intended.   In many of these 
mishaps, the primary cause was identified as human ‘error’.  Partly in consequence, investigatory agencies have 
issued general advice on the use of GPS technology.  For instance, the New Zealand Maritime agency has argued 
that: “GPS derived positions are a useful tool in determining a vessels position but should be used in conjunction 
with all other means of position fixing at the navigators disposal. The temptation to push a button to obtain such data 
and not utilize more labour intensive, traditional methods of position fixing is, to put it bluntly, bad seamanship that 
puts vessels and their crew at risk. Maritime New Zealand is concerned at what appears to be a growing tendency for 
mariners to place excessive reliance on GPS generated data in place of traditional methods of navigation and issues 
a strong warning against such practise” (Maritime New Zealand, 2006).   
 
Much of this important advice is focussed on the recommendations that emerge from particular incidents.  There 
have been few attempts to gather together the lessons that can derived from a number of different mishaps across a 
range of different industries.    The following pages, therefore, provide a brief overview of recent accidents in the 
aviation and maritime industries in which it is argued that interaction with GPS technology either triggered or 
exacerbated various forms of operator failure. 
 
The Operational Benefits of Interactive GPS 
 
The benefits of GPS and associated technology can be illustrated by the extent to which they have become 
integrated into a number of safety-critical industries.   For example, a recent accident report described the standard 
navigational aids on board a fishing vessel equipped for a crew of three, these included: a radar, an echo sounder, a 
watch keepers alarm and an autopilot.  The fishing vessel also carried two different GPS plotters and a GPS receiver 
(Maritime New Zealand, 2004).   The significance of this equipment can also be illustrated by the consequences that 
can arise when it is used incorrectly.   The subsequent investigation found that the vessel had run aground because 
the skipper had not set waypoints on the GPS equipment but had instead been using the cursor on one of the GPS 
plotters to keep an informal note of course and position. 
 
Before reviewing hazards that can arise during interaction with GPS technology in more detail, it is first important to 
summarise the wide range of benefits that these applications provide to their users.   The problems that complicate 
interaction with these systems often stem from the operational features that provide the greatest utility under normal 
operations.   As noted in the previous citation, the accuracy and availability of GPS data can lead to an over reliance 
that leaves users unprepared to cope when these systems fail.   The following list summarises further benefits of 
positioning technology.   Subsequent sections use this list, together with an analysis of previous accidents to identify 
many of the problems that arise during the use of these systems.  
 
1. Reduced workload. An important benefit of GPS applications is that they can reduce workload across teams 
of operators in safety-critical systems.   The precise nature of this support varies from domain to domain.  
For example, in many commercial maritime systems the data from GPS applications is seen as an adjunct 
to rather than a replacement for conventional manual and radar based navigation techniques.   However, as 
we shall see, in other parts of the world crews have come to rely on GPS technology within routine 
operations so that alternate techniques for location identification are only used to supplement GPS readings.  
In other words, the bulk of routine navigation tasks has passed from manual and radar based techniques to 
the automated satellite based systems. 
 
2. Reduce uncertainty.  In many applications, navigation is a complex task in which operators have to account 
for subtle changes in meteorological and other environmental conditions.   Under poor visibility, it can be 
 difficult to account for the influence of varying tides or wind speeds using dead reckoning.   In other areas, 
for example in desert or jungle terrains and other remote areas there may be insufficient landmarks or radar 
beacons to easily employ alternate forms of navigation.  In such circumstances, GPS tools provide a critical 
means of reducing uncertainty in complex navigation tasks. 
 
3. Multi-criteria optimisation.   GPS tools cannot be viewed in isolation.   The position information that they 
provide is, typically, integrated into a wide range of location finding and route planning systems.  This 
integration enables complex optimisation tasks to be performed where for example speed can be traded for 
fuel usage or routes can be tailored to avoid congestion.  These optimisation tasks would otherwise occupy 
considerable perceptual and cognitive resources if they had to be performed manually.  This creates 
significant vulnerabilities when operators must learn to cope with degraded modes of operation (Johnson 
and Shea, 2007). 
 
4. Dynamic problem solving.    An important aspect of multi-criteria optimisation is the manner in which GPS 
applications can quickly compute alternate routes or changes in performance characteristics in order to 
achieve particular objectives in the face of changes both in an application process or operating 
environment.   For example, positioning equipment can automatically monitor the mean speed of its 
operator over given terrain and then adjust routing information to exclude similar areas should they fall 
behind the predicted schedule.   As with many of the benefits identified in previous items, it is often 
infeasible for operators to manually conduct the continual forms of self-monitoring that routinely inform 
route revision algorithms in existing applications.   
 
5. Monitoring of primary systems.  GPS systems provide an important means of confirming information that 
can also be derived from primary sensors.   For example, it is possible to use successive location fixes to 
compute speed in a range of aviation, ground and maritime applications.   Similarly, the influence of tides 
and currents can be inferred by comparison of performance data with location information over time.  
Significant deviations between the GPS derive data and the output of other primary systems can also be 
used to trigger alarms for the crew that warn them of potential failures in either application. 
 
6. Multiple input mappings.  GPS tools can also be used to navigate using a range of different input data.  This 
might seem like a trivial issue.  However, there are strong benefits to be achieved if crew can choose 
whether or not to specify a route in terms of individual waypoints, physical landmarks, map coordinates or 
even ZIP codes.  The difficulty of translating from these navigational reference systems into a single input 
scheme increases burdens on operators especially if they are under time pressure.  GPS applications often 
provide considerable flexibility so that information can be entered in a form that is convenient and familiar 
to the end user. 
 
7.  Multiple output mappings.  GPS systems also offer considerable flexibility to their users in terms of the 
presentation format of navigational information.   They offer a host of two and three dimensional graphical 
displays where map or plan views can be extended to show fly-by simulations of potential routes from or to 
a known location.  In other domains, GPS data is used to generate audio alarms so that crew members are 
only alerted when they have moved close to a known danger or away from a recommended course.   Audio 
warnings can also be used to provide alerts when there are potential disagreements between primary 
sensors and GPS technology, indicating possible system failures. 
 
8. Log maintenance.  The Global Positioning System and future location technologies provide increasingly 
important resources for accident investigators.  These tools can automatically log location changes over 
time to a level of granularity that is infeasible using manual documentation techniques.   In consequence, 
GPS data is often the primary resource for identifying the location of a vessel or aircraft immediately 
before a mishap occurred.   From the perspective of system operators, the availability of GPS log functions 
may be used to justify some reduction in the frequency of manual recording.    
 
This is a partial list.  The range of benefits derived from the Global Positioning System will increase in proportion to 
the variety of potential applications.   However, these strengths also create potential vulnerabilities.   Increasing 
reliance on navigational tools can erode traditional skills and leave operators particularly exposed when they are 
deprived of these components in their underlying infrastructure. 
  
 
 
 
Incidents and Accidents Involving Interaction with GPS Tools in the Aviation and Maritime Industries 
 
Marine Accident 1 - The Royal Majesty: Arguably one of the most notorious recent incidents involving interaction 
with GPS applications occurred in 1995 with the grounding of the cruise ship Royal Majesty (NTSB, 1997, 
Heidiecker et al, 2003). The GPS receiver on the Royal Majesty provided position data that was accurate to within 
100 meters.  The crew also had access to a Loran-C radio-based navigation system.  This relies on time differences 
between land based radio signals to provide position data along the coasts of the United States.   Both GPS and 
Loran-C data were fed to an integrated NACOS 25 autopilot that could be programmed with the vessels 
performance characteristics using waypoints specified in terms of latitude and longitude.   The NACOS unit 
provided a number of operating modes.  For example, the NAV function could be used to steer the vessel along a 
pre-programmed track using the GPS and other senor inputs to compensate for gyro error, wind, current and sea 
conditions.    Alternatively, the unit could operate in HYBRID navigation mode using position data from Loran-C or 
two other positional systems not based on GPS.   The unit was also programmed to default to a DEAD 
RECKONING mode when satellite data were unavailable. When the GPS unit switched to dead reckoning mode it 
was designed to issues a series of warning sounds lasting around a second.   The unit would also display the letters 
‘DR’ indicating the transition into this mode.  On the night of the accident, all the officers of the watch testified that 
they did not see ‘DR’ displayed on the GPS unit. They did, however, confirm that they understood the meaning of 
these symbols and had seen them on previous occasions. 
 
Following the accident it was determined that the vessel lost all contact with satellite based position data around 
thirty minutes after it left port.  The failure was traced back to the antenna assembly; however, there was insufficient 
evidence to accurately identify the cause of the problem.   Several hypotheses were generated.   The GPS antenna 
had originally been installed on the radar mast.  Several months before the accident, it had been moved to improve 
signal reception. Subsequent examinations indicated that the GPS antenna was incorrectly routed so that members of 
the crew could inadvertently kick it or trip over it.   This, in turn, created stresses that might contribute to the 
separation of the antenna cable connection.  The antenna had also been painted on two occasions.   The consequence 
of the antenna failure was that the vessel continued to record alternate courses of 197° and 000° from shortly after 
leaving harbour until the vessel’s arrived in Boston even though it had maintained a course close to 336° before the 
accident. The logs also recorded a speed of 12.7 knots.  This was not consistent with the speeds recorded manually 
in the bridge log. In other words, the interruption of the satellite signal placed the GPS into dead reckoning mode.   
The autopilot did not detect this change in status and no longer began to correct for the effects of wind, current, or 
sea conditions. As might be expected the actual position began to drift with respect to the location indicated through 
dead reckoning.   The effects of an east-north-easterly wind and sea resulted in a 17-mile error.  
 
The previous paragraphs have briefly outlined the technical causes of the GPS failure.   In contrast, the focus of this 
paper is on the human factors issues that arose during interaction with the navigation equipment.  According to the 
master, he arrived on the bridge around 22:00.   After talking with the second officer for several minutes, he checked 
the vessel’s position using the plots on the chart and at a map overlay on the ARPA radar display.   This system 
enabled the officers to move the radar display to know locations that could be identified from the navigation system.  
The corresponding plots could then be compared for accuracy with the direct radar feeds to the bridge.   The master 
asked the second officer whether he had seen the BB buoy and the second officer stated that he had. Satisfied that 
the positions plotted on the chart and that the map displayed on the radar continued to show the vessel to be 
following its intended track, the master left the bridge around 22:10.    
 
There were several further opportunities for the crew to identify the potential problem before the grounding took 
place.  Others officers on the bridge received reports that the lookouts had sighting several high red lights as well as 
a flashing red light on the port bow.  These were inconsistent with the current positional information and should 
have caused the officers to look again at the radar systems.  They might have noticed that the radar maps did not 
coincide with the ARPA display.   They might also have increased the range of radar systems and then identify their 
proximity to Nantucket Island. Had the officers queried the flashing red light, they might have determined that the 
nearest source was the Rose and Crown Shoal buoy.  This could have warned them that they were no longer in the 
traffic lanes.  The subsequent investigation concluded, however, that the officers of the watch had only a limited 
 understanding of the functioning of their GPS systems.  This was compounded by the way in which procedures 
failed to ensure the use of diverse positional information.  For example, the master required that officers continue to 
make manual plots of their location.  However, his colleagues used GPS as the most convenient source for this 
information.   In consequences, the fixes that were plotted on the chart corresponded with the map and positions 
displayed on the central console.   The manual plotting was, therefore, derived from the GPS data.  
 
The grounding of the Royal Majesty provides an important case study for the analysis in the paper because it 
illustrates many of the problems that complicate interaction with GPS applications.   Firstly, like many similar 
systems the vessel was provided with multiple redundant sources of location information.  However, this 
redundancy was little more than ‘skin deep’.  In practice, the convenience of GPS systems meant that the crew relied 
on this source of data to guide all of their monitoring and validation procedures for navigational information.  This 
created further vulnerabilities because different members of the crew each assumed that their co-workers were 
accessing diverse information sources and so felt justified in them continuing only to rely on GPS input.   Secondly, 
the Royal Majesty illustrates the dangers that arise when GPS applications are integrated into more complex systems 
that are, typically, not well understood by the people who must operate them.  In this case, the master and the 
officers could recognise the dead reckoning mode but they were poorly prepared for the causes and consequences of 
failures that could lead to this style of operation. 
 
Marine Accident 2 – Sanga Na Langa: The consequences and notoriety of the Royal Majesty accident justify its 
inclusion in this analysis.  However, it is important not to overlook the growing number of less well known incidents 
involving interaction with GPS technology that have been reported across a range of industries.   For instance, the 
New Zealand maritime agency report on the grounding of the Sanga Na Langa, a 13.5 meter commercial passenger 
and fishing vessel operating off Waiheke Island in the Hauraki Gulf, in 2006 (Maritime New Zealand, 2006).  As 
with many similar incidents, the skipper was familiar with the area of coast in which the incident occurred.  In 
particular, he knew the location of a range of offshore rocks that posed a danger to mariners.  These rocks were well 
indicated on the display unit of his GPS applications and were indicated at some off the starboard side of the vessel.   
The skipper’s sense of wellbeing was increased by his confidence in the GPS, which had been installed and 
calibrated by a friend some six years before.   It had also always given him accurate readings before, although the 
unit had previously been repaired by the manufacturer’s agent to correct a display fault.  He was also using an 
electronic chart that is widely used in the area where he was operating.    
 
The skipper reported that he was just about to refer to a paper chart when a lookout identified broken water ahead.   
Approximately ten seconds later, the vessel’s hull and propeller ground over the top of a rock.  The bilge pumps 
were able to cope with the subsequent ingress of water and the vessel was successfully beached.  The official report 
into the incident concluded that the skipper had broken ‘one of the cardinal rules of navigation namely over reliance 
on GPS data’ (Maritime New Zealand, 2006).    Similarly, the electronic chart came with the warning that it should 
only be used as a backup to official government paper charts and traditional methods of navigation.  The day after 
the accident, the skipper observed that the GPS placed the vessel on top of a small island even though they were 
some distance away from it on their homeward journey.  This significantly undermined the skipper’s confidence in 
GPS technology.  This sudden erosion of trust that may take many years to establish also illustrates the central role 
of human factors issues in the operation of new generations of navigation equipment. 
 
The grounding of the Sanga Na Langa is also instructive because it illustrates some of the problems that arise for 
investigatory agencies when they attempt to diagnose the causes of problems with GPS applications.   These systems 
can provide incorrect data for a variety of reasons.   GPS assisted groundings are often caused by inaccuracies in 
electronic charts. In this case, the manufacturer’s representatives noted that the position of the rocks as displayed on 
the screen correlated with their position in the government maps.  The investigators concluded that ‘it is not 
uncommon for display screens that have been monitoring a vessel’s position whilst stationary, for example whilst 
berthed overnight, to show positions a considerable distance from the vessel’s position’ (Maritime New Zealand, 
2006). 
 
This incident again illustrates a number of key issues that complicate interaction with GPS system in safety-related 
domains.   The skipper of the Sanga Na Langa was familiar with the area in which they were operating.   This seems 
to be a common feature of many similar accidents.  Further work is required to provide more sustained evidence that 
familiarity with a location increases the likelihood of being involved in a GPS related incident.   It is possible to 
identify a number of potential explanations for this hypothesised correlation.   For instance, if an operator 
 understands local hazards then they may be more willing to dismiss them as soon as they can be seen on a GPS 
application without necessarily checking to ensure that the GPS has accurately located those hazards. 
 
The grounding of the Sanga Na Langa raises further issues.   For example, the skipper placed a high degree of trust 
in the reliability and calibration of their GPS application.   In part, this was justified by his experience of the 
operational performance of the unit.   However, it may also have been influenced by the growth of consumer 
applications for this technology.  GPS is increasingly being integrated into mass market ‘of the shelf’ products.  
Familiarity may create an unjustified degree of confidence in the reliability of what is a complex, distributed system 
of systems. 
 
Aviation 1- Cessna Floatplane: The introduction to this paper has stressed the need to exchange insights and lessons 
learned from GPS induced mishaps across several different safety-critical industries.  It is for this reason that the 
following examples focus on interaction with new navigation technologies within both commercial and general 
aviation.   Again, it is important to stress that the use of GPS related systems has figured as a contributory cause in 
both major accidents and in less well publicised incidents.  For example, the US NTSB describes how the pilot of a 
Cessna 208 seaplane forgot to retract the gear on takeoff from a runway.   This version of the aircraft has wheel 
installed on the floats.   On approaching his destination the pilot realised that the navigation system was using the 
position of a nearby resort island called Filitheyo rather than the GPS position of the landing site about 2.5 miles (4 
km) to the north. The captain, therefore, began attempting to correct the GPS co-ordinates for the landing site.  
 
As he touched the water, the aircraft seemed to ‘spring back’ and the captain recognized that he had left the landing 
gear down. The aircraft flipped onto its back pivoting on its nose and left wing.   The subsequent investigation 
identified pilot error as the probable cause of the accident.  Contributory factors included a failure to use the 
approved checklist when ensuring that the landing gear was properly raised, a failure to monitor appropriate 
instruments and a failure to pay due attention to aural warnings.   The manufacturer responses to the incident by 
changing the aural ‘gear down’ warning to occur at a higher speed, ‘thereby allowing the pilot time to react 
accordingly without distraction during the final approach segment of the flight’ (NTSB, 2000).   The pilot was 
recommended to undergo additional type training. 
 
One of the most salient features of this incident is that the recommendations focussed on the retraining of the pilot 
and on minor technical changes in the on-board warning systems for the landing gear.   The findings of the 
investigation did not focus on the problems that the pilot experienced in interacting with the navigation systems.   
Previous research has identified a broad range of issues that complicate the reprogramming of GPS applications in 
safety related domains (Johnson, 2004).  These range from the confusion that often arises over the difference 
between insertion and appending of a waypoint into a list of fixes through to the difficulty of distinguishing between 
the different modes of operation that are provided by these navigation systems.   In this case, a relatively minor 
correction to the location of the destination could not be completed by the pilot without considerable concentration.  
However, the subsequent investigation did not explicitly raise this as an area for further concern.    
 
In other areas of human computer interaction and human factors, there has been a move away from blaming 
operators who experience similar problems during interaction with complex systems.  It has been argued that 
retraining the users will only alleviate the symptoms of an underlying problem but will not address the causes 
(Johnson book).   In contrast, greater emphasis has been placed on the need to redesign interactive systems rather 
than rely on retraining to address previous weaknesses in the operation of complex systems. 
 
A final area of concern focuses on the dual nature of GPS navigation systems.  One of the primary reasons for the 
introduction of these applications into safety critical systems has been that they can effectively reduce workload for 
crew members who might otherwise be preoccupied with relatively routine navigation tasks.   The floatplane 
incident illustrates that these applications can also increase workload during key stages of flight.   In particular, 
complex user interfaces create particular problems for the individuals and crews that must reprogram or reconfigure 
them in response to particular operational problems.   In this incident, even a relatively minor correction occupied 
the pilot’s finite perceptual and cognitive resources to such an extent that safety was undermined. 
 
Aviation 2 – Bamiyan Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT): The second aviation accident forms a contrast to the 
relatively minor incident described in the previous paragraphs.  Just as the grounding of the fishing vessel Sanga Na 
Langa contrasts with the more serious damage to the cruise liner Royal Majesty.  This incident occurred in 
 November 2004when a Construcciones Aeronauticas Sociedad Anonima C-212-CC (CASA 212) twin-engine, 
turboprop airplane collided with mountainous terrain close to the Bamiyan Valley, near Bamiyan, Afghanistan. 
Several factors increased the significance of this accident.  The aircraft was operating under a US Department of 
Defence (DoD) contract.  The captain, first officer, and mechanic-certificated passenger, who were U.S. civilians 
employed by the operator, and the three military passengers, who were active-duty U.S. Army soldiers, received 
fatal injuries. The airplane was destroyed (NTSB, 2006).  
The subsequent enquiry interviewed the program site manager who stated that he was not aware if route planning was 
explicitly performed for the mission. The accepted visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan contained destination 
information but did not indicate a specific route. Instead he argued that the pilots tended to follow well known routes 
between specific locations using a combination of GPS fixes and direct visual observations to ensure adequate clearance 
above mountainous terrain.  However, analysis of the cockpit voice recorder revealed that the crew had never flown the 
selected route before.  The mechanic was also heard to observe that the valley they had chosen to follow was not the 
most direct route.  The captain later replied saying that they would ‘just have to see where this leads’.   The captain, 
first officer and the mechanic then discussed a topological map, the outside visual references and the coordinates 
derived from their GPS applications.  The captain was then heard to remark ‘well normally we’d have time to on a 
short day like this we’d have time to play a little bit do some explorin’ but with those winds comin’ up I want to 
[expletive] get there as fast as we can...with this good visibility … it’s as easy as pie. you run into somethin’ big you 
just parallel it until you find a way thru [sic]. … this is the first good visibility day I’ve had in the Casa. It’s not just 
good it’s outstanding’ (NTSB, 2006).   Sometime later the mechanic stated ‘I don’t know what we’re gunna see, we 
don’t normally go this route’.  The captain replied ‘...all we want is to avoid seeing rock at twelve o’clock and the 
first officer stated ‘Yeah you’re an x-wing fighter star wars man’.   The captain then replied ‘You’re [expletive] 
right. This is fun’.  These informal exchanges continued when a passenger asked the flight crew about the route of 
the flight and the captain discussed some of their previous mountain flying experiences with the first officer. Shortly 
afterwards, the first officer stated that the ridgeline off to their left had a minimum elevation of approximately 
14,000 feet meters above sea level. The captain stated that he was trying to find a ‘notch to fly through’, shortly 
afterwards the mechanic asked ‘okay you guys are gunna make this right?’ and the captain replied, “yeah h I’m 
hopin’.  Ten seconds later, voice recorder seems to capture a stall warning tone single beep.   The captain stated they 
could execute a 180º turnaround and instructed the first officer to lower the flaps.  A further stall warning occurred 
and the mechanic stated, ‘call off his airspeed for him’.  The first officer responded ‘you got ninety five’ shortly 
before the recording ended. 
The subsequent investigation argued that the exchanges captured on the cockpit voice recorder provided important 
insights into the attitude and behaviour of the crew in the immediate run up to the crash.   It was suggested that the 
captain and first officer acted ‘unprofessionally’ in deliberately flying a nonstandard route low through the valley for 
fun even though the visibility was ‘outstanding’.  The captain’s comment that he ‘wouldn’t have done this if we 
were at gross’ was interpreted to mean that the captain made a conscious decision to fly the airplane in a way that he 
would not have done if the airplane had been at maximum gross weight. 
This incident illustrates further aspects of the complex interactions that take place in the events leading to accidents 
that involve GPS applications.   In this case, the use of navigation equipment was not a direct cause of the mishap.   
Instead it can be argued that it played a more circumstantial role in increasing the confidence of the crew that they 
could navigate their way out of the box canyon using little more planning that visual observations and periodic 
updates to their known location using satellite technology.   In other words, the provision of GPS services formed a 
key component in the infrastructure that supported the sense of complacency that was criticised in the NTSB report.   
This complacency, in turn, was constructed on the high degree of trust that many operators place on modern 
navigation systems.  As we have seen in previous accidents, this element of trust often goes far beyond what is 
advised by manufacturers and designers.   It may also lead the operators of safety critical systems into situations 
from which navigation fixes may be insufficient to ensure the success of complex operations. 
 
Overview of Human Factors Dangers of GPS 
 
Previous sections have used two maritime and two aviation accidents to provide a limited overview of a wider range 
of recent mishaps that have arisen from operator interaction with GPS technology.   These incidents have been 
deliberately selected to include both high profile failures, such as the grounding of the Royal Majesty, as well as 
lesser known but equally significant accidents in which users have been forced to cope without the expected support 
 that they normally rely upon from satellite navigation systems, such as the CFIT involving the Cessna floatplane.  
Based on these incidents it is possible to develop an initial list of interaction problems that have occurred in the 
events leading to adverse events involving GPS related systems: 
 
1. Increased Workload.   The opening sections made the point that many of the benefits of GPS technology 
also create potential weaknesses under degraded modes of operation.  For example, an important strength 
of many systems is that they remove the burdens associated with routine navigation tasks.   However, many 
they also create additional workload in setting the systems up.   Additional time must be devoted to 
planning a potential route and then programming appropriate waypoints into the system.  Similarly, the 
complexity of interaction with these programmable systems can create significant dangers when operators 
are forced to fix even relatively trivial problems during more critical phases of operation.   The additional 
burdens associated with specifying a revised destination for the floatplane is assumed to have prevented the 
pilot from realising that they were landing on water with the wheels extended. 
 
2. Interruption of Primary Tasks.  The failure of navigational systems can create a sudden increase in 
workload for particular crew members during critical phases of a safety related task.   In other 
circumstances, problems may stem less from additional workload than from the way in which GPS tools 
can interrupt other non-navigational primary tasks.  These interruptions occur during both normal and 
degraded modes of operation.   It can be argued that there is a danger the pilot of the float plane might have 
forgotten to raise the landing gear even if he had been able to resolve the apparent problem with the 
destination fix.   Human factors research indicates that even temporary distractions can be sufficient to 
cause slips and lapses in otherwise accurate plans (Reason, 1990).  Several recent accident reports have 
described how crew deliberately chose to turn off the distractions created by the alarms generated by GPS 
applications (New Zealand Civil Aviation Authority, 2003). 
 
3. Hazards of Fail-silent Modes.    The floatplane accident was not caused because the GPS failed.   In 
contrast, the system was programmed with the incorrect destination.  The pilot observed the potential 
problem and intervened to resolve it.  In contrast, the Royal Majesty ran aground because the autopilot and 
associated GPS continued to operate in a limited form of ‘fail silent’ mode based on dead reckoning.   The 
crew were, therefore, faced with the opposite problems to those described in the previous item.  Rather than 
being faced with the additional workload involved in solving a GPS failure, the crew continued to operate 
the system as though it were functioning normally when in fact they were receiving increasingly erroneous 
navigation data. 
 
4. Over-Reliance on Navigational Data.   A common theme across all of the incidents in this paper is the high 
degree of trust that operators place in GPS technology and their associated navigation systems.   One 
element in this may be the increasing integration GPS applications into mass market consumer products.   
This may suggest that there is no additional requirement to consider the reliability and accuracy of GPS 
readings within the context of safety-critical systems; familiarity may breed complacency.   The skipper of 
the Sanga Na Langa had operated his navigation systems for several years without any perceived failures 
and hence was extremely surprised when over-reliance on GPS data led to the grounding of his vessel.   
 
5. Lack of Hazard Monitoring and Over-Reliance on GPS Alarms.     Previous items in this list have 
considered the human factors problems that can arise when operators come to rely too much on the 
navigational information provided by GPS applications.   One variation of this potential hazard stems less 
from any failure to monitor location information than from the high level of trust that can be placed on the 
alarms provided by these systems.   For example, many autopilots enable operators to specify when visual 
and audio alarms are raised as they approach known hazards.  This enables crew members to devote their 
attention to other primary tasks than to monitor the location of potential hazards in their environment.  
However, the grounding of the Sanga Na Langa illustrates what can happen when these alarms are not 
raised.   
 
6. Inaccuracies in Charts and Maps. The Sanga Na Langa incident also revealed further hazards from 
interactive navigation systems.   The subsequent investigation conducted several studies to ensure not that 
the GPS was functioning correctly but to ensure the accuracy of the associated electronic charts.  Even 
when operators may be concerned to verify the location data provided by GPS applications, they may rely 
 too much on the location of hazards identified in electronic charts and maps.   Many of these data sources 
were drawn up at a time when these technologies were not available and, therefore, may not be as accurate 
as the fixes that are routinely available across many industries.  In other words, the widespread availability 
of accurate navigational aids is exposing the inaccuracies in many of the charts and maps that guide the 
operators of safety-critical applications. 
 
7. Erosion of Traditional Navigational Skills and Practices. A continuing concern through several of the 
reports that were studied in this paper is the suggestion that the increasing use of GPS will lead to an 
erosion of traditional navigation skills and practices.  This does not simply refer to the users’ ability to 
make an accurate fix on their position.  It also stems from a concern that operators are not taking the same 
degree of care in planning their intended route in the belief that they can always rely on GPS support to get 
them out of any eventual problem.  The lack of route planning before the loss of the CASA 212 may 
provide an eloquent example of this concern.   It can be argued that greater care might have been taken by 
the crew had they not been able to rely on the support provided by satellite navigation systems.  As we have 
seen, however, the benefits provided by their technology are not always sufficient to address the wide range 
of operation problems that can arise during safety-related operations in unknown terrain. 
 
This list is not exhaustive; it summarises only those concerns that arose in the incidents examined in this paper.   .   
It seems clear that further problems will arise in the interaction between operators and the increasingly complex 
technologies that are being integrated with GPS and its successors.   It is ironic; however, that the rising number of 
these adverse events may still not outweigh the larger number of adverse events which have occurred because 
individuals and teams of co-workers chose NOT to use navigational systems (New Zealand Maritime, 2004). 
 
Conclusions and Further Work 
 
The Global Positioning System (GPS) uses a network of orbiting and geostationary satellites to calculate the 
position of a receiver over time.   This technology has revolutionised a wide range of safety-critical industries and 
leisure applications ranging from commercial fisheries through to mountain running.    These systems provide 
diverse benefits; supplementing the users existing navigation skills and reducing the uncertainty that characterises 
route planning tasks.  GPS applications also reduce workload by automating tasks that would otherwise consume 
finite cognitive and perceptual resources.  However, the operation of these systems has contributed to a number of 
recent accidents.   Users often come to rely on GPS applications and, therefore, fail to notice when they develop 
faults or when errors occur in the other systems that use the data from these systems.   Further accidents can stem 
from the ‘over confidence’ that arises when users assume automated warnings will be issued when they stray from 
an intended route.   This paper has argued that greater attention must be paid to the human factors of GPS 
applications as these technologies are integrated into increasing numbers of applications. 
 
The timeliness of this work is increased by the realisation that GPS applications are increasingly being used as 
primary navigation systems.   Standard operating procedures across many industries maintain that staff must not rely 
on these applications; they must use them to supplement more traditional manual forms of route planning.  The 
accidents reported in this paper together with a host of similar mishaps reveal that operational practices may instead 
be built on the use of GPS with other techniques only being used intermittently for additional assurance.   It is also 
important to emphasise the wider impact of GPS on system safety.  The availability of accurate real-time navigation 
systems is no longer viewed as an additional enhancement to existing operational practices.  Instead, these 
applications can be seen as capacity enablers.   Users will erode safety margins providing that they can call upon the 
information provided by GPS technology.  They will travel faster at closer distances from known hazards.  This 
exposes operators and members of the public to even greater hazards when problems do occur with positioning 
systems. 
 
A limitation of the work presented in this paper is that we have not explored the underlying perceptual and cognitive 
factors that contribute to GPS related incidents and accidents.  It seems clear that trust in the services provided by 
navigational systems contributes to a form of over-confidence.  Many accident reports describe the sense of surprise 
that operators express when they realise that there may have been a problem with navigation systems; ‘He will never 
again depend on GPS data to the same extent again and is happy to relate his experience so that other mariners will 
learn from his mistake’ (New Zealand Maritime, 2006).  Further work is required to understand the precise 
 mechanisms that account for such over-confidence so that we can better prepare individuals and teams of co-
workers for the many problems that can arise when interaction breaks down with GPS applications. 
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